Industroyer2
A later variant, publicly described in 2022, aimed at high-voltage grid equipment in Ukraine. It is related to, but not identical with, the 2016 Industroyer family.
Attribution brief
Sandworm / GRU Unit 74455, in CERT-UA and industry reporting later reflected in official discussions of Russian operations against Ukrainian energy
Attributed
Russia (attributed)
Historical profile
April 2022 (public reporting of an attempted or actual use against a Ukrainian energy provider; CERT-UA public advisories)
Public evidence and its limits are recorded in the cited sources.
Impact & public record
A later variant, publicly described in 2022, aimed at high-voltage grid equipment in Ukraine. It is related to, but not identical with, the 2016 Industroyer family.
Data Trust / Partial
Partial. 2022 public reporting and the Sandworm association: Verified at advisory level. A precise operational outcome metric: Unverified (—).
Sources
- CERT-UA public advisories on the 2022 incident
- ESET public analysis of Industroyer2



